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1. The aim of the dissertation and the theoretical background 
 
In the recent years, more and more countries had to face the problem that their government 
debt / gross domestic product quotients’ dynamics were not sustainable. The most important 
factors in this process were smaller growth, bad structural balance of the budget, and high 
financing costs of the government debt, which is related to the increasing sovereign yields. 
These three factors are closely related, but we can highlight that on the one hand, raising the 
growth rate and balancing the budget could be done by using either different (for example 
positive fiscal stimulus vs. fiscal tightening) or very unpopular measures (like making more 
flexible working laws, or raising the retirement age). On the other hand, it might be possible 
to reach success by decreasing the sovereign yields. 
The primary market of government bills and bonds is one of the most important fields 
where financing costs of government debt are evolving. The primary market affects financing 
costs through the selling price of government bills and bonds. These securities are in many 
cases – as for example in the case of domestic papers in Hungary - sold through auctions. 
Nowadays, two auction techniques (discriminatory and uniform-price auctions) are most 
commonly used for the sale of securities, specifically government bills and bonds. Since the 
selling price of the papers is influenced by the technique of the auction, a comparison of the 
discriminatory and uniform-price auctions would be helpful to determine which of the two 
most commonly used auction formats is the better allocation mechanism under given 
conditions. 
The financing costs of the government debt are also strongly related to the country’s credit 
risk premium, measured mostly through sovereign CDS spreads. This has two reasons. First, 
the foreign currency denominated bond yields can be decomposed to a risk-free yield (like the 
sovereign German Euro-yield or the USA Dollar-yield) and the rest of the bond yield, which 
is called bond spread. The bond spread is generally near to the CDS spread, and CDS spreads 
tend to lead bond spreads (Alper et al. [2012]; Varga [2009]). Second, in the case of domestic 
bonds, the credit risk of the country also has a significant effect on yields on the longer terms. 
The credit risk premium of the local currency denominated bonds might be somewhat 
different from CDS spreads, but CDS spreads have a significant co-movement with long term 
domestic yields (Monostori [2012b], Monostori [2013e]). While sovereign credit risk and 
CDS spreads are very actual topics also in academia, our research question has some 
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traditional background. Part III’s objective is to empirically assess the role of country-specific 
fundamental determinants in shaping Eastern European relative CDS spreads.  
Part IV is an application of the model to the Hungarian CDS spreads. In this case study we 
identify the country-specific determinants of the last years’ processes of Hungarian CDS 
spreads.  
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2. Methodology 
 
The expected revenue of uniform-price and discriminatory auctions cannot be ranked 
definitively based on analytical studies; therefore it may be appropriate to approach this issue 
on an empirical basis. The empirical evidence of real-world auctions provide a robust answer 
to the question of expected revenue; the uniform-price format coming out as more beneficial 
for the Treasury. Experiments fall into two categories: in the first case, comparison is enabled 
by the fact that the auction format of identical goods was changed from a given time, while in 
the other case, there were other treasuries to auction different products in a close-to-identical 
time interval with different methods. However, all experiments have been plagued by the 
identification problem, that is, the change caused by the auction method is difficult to tell 
apart from the effects of other circumstances. It would be a real scientific breakthrough, 
though, to set up a real-life experiment in which the same product would be sold 
simultaneously in both uniform-price and discriminatory auctions. Even though fewer 
conclusions could be drawn than in the previously proposed arrangement (due to the 
repetition of auctions), it would be instructive to see an experiment where primary market 
actors have to submit bids for both auction formats, then the real format would be decided by 
drawing lots. We should note, however, that the experiment may increase the ‘fog of war’, i.e. 
the strategy space may become even more complicated and the number of possible equilibria 
may increase to extreme heights. Such an experiment could be a very important step in future 
work; however, it has to be supported by a bond issuer. 
Hence, in Part II our methodology is a comparative analysis through the relevant literature 
about discriminatory and uniform price auctions. The same methodology is used by such 
important papers in this topic as Das & Sundaram [1997]; Binmore & Swierzbinski [2000], or 
in Hungary (Szatmári [1996b]), and the most recent Hungarian study of this subject, (Kondrát 
[1996]). The latter Hungarian papers focused primarily on models based on the unit demand 
assumption; whereas researchers have demonstrated that these findings are often not 
applicable to all of the multi-unit auctions, so a new review might be reasonable. I will 
examine the following hypotheses: 
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H1: We can give an accurate answer to the question, whether the uniform price or the 
discriminatory auction format is the better allocation mechanism under given conditions 
in Hungary. 
In Part III we take the traditional and simple methodological approach of Edwards ([1983]; 
[1985])  and a wealth of publications since to date. We adhere to the literature in assuming 
that most of the time series variation in CDS spreads are a result of common shocks to the 
pricing of risk and we concentrate the analysis on the other, cross-sectional aspect of CDS 
spreads by assessing which fundamental factors have been empirically important in 
explaining the relative riskiness of countries as proxied by the relative magnitude of these 
indicators. In terms of estimation methodology we use a time fixed effects panel regression on 
both the levels and changes of spreads and fundamental variables. We link the short-run 
dynamics with the relationship between variable levels through an error-correction term. 
H2: Contrary to the assumptions of efficient markets, rational investors and the 
absence of arbitrage opportunities, which would imply immediate adjustment of spreads 
to newly available fundamental information, changes in fundamental variables mainly 
affect CDS spreads gradually, through an error-correction mechanism. 
We lay emphasis on using a dataset that treats some empirical issues that, in previous 
studies, have often been disregarded. First, we use projections of future variables instead of 
actual data where possible. CDS spreads (and bond spreads) derive from expected future cash 
flows during the tenure of the instrument. Therefore it is arguably the expectations of the 
variables influencing credit spreads (growth, budget balance, etc.) and not the actual data 
available at the time that matters. Using actual data instead of expectations introduces a 
source of error, and it will contaminate inference on how the variable affects spreads. This 
error will be larger for variables whose expectations are in general more volatile. Also, a 
mistake can be made in assessing the explanatory power of macroeconomic variables when 
comparing their actual data with financial time series. Though macroeconomic variables 
change (or are observed) infrequently, while financial indicators fluctuate on high frequency, 
it may be the case that the expectation of macroeconomic variables is just as volatile as the 
financial time series and that this explains more of the latter’s variation than actual data. 
Second, we aim to reduce the adverse effects of variable omissions by including a larger and 
conceptually wider set of fundamental variables than usual in similar studies. Besides the 
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standard macroeconomic variables, we incorporate data on the banking sector and use a set of 
political and institutional variables as well. 
H3: Besides the standard macroeconomic variables, data on the banking sector and 
institutional-political variables are also important in the relative credit risk premium of 
a country. 
Principal components and factors are extracted from conceptually similar variables’ groups 
and these are then used in CDS spreads’ regressions to overcome problems of 
multicollinearity and the curse of dimensionality. To further limit adverse effects of variable 
omission, we attempt to make use of the extra information contained in credit ratings 
compared to that in our fundamental variable set. 
Although we do not explicitly incorporate cross-section and time period heterogeneity of 
fundamental variables’ effects in our baseline model, we do check the robustness of our 
general results on subsamples. Also, regressions are re-estimated on shorter time windows to 
gain an intuition on how coefficients have evolved through time. 
H4: Some of the fundamental variables’ impacts are time-varying. 
In Part IV we apply the model from Part III to Hungarian data. We use simple descriptive 
statistics to analyze the latest developments. To quantify the two distinct effects on the 
relative Hungarian CDS spread, i.e. the worsening of fundamentals and the shift in investor 
preferences (the wake-up call effect), we use the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Blinder 
[1973]; Oaxaca [1973]). Applied to our context the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition separates 
the effect of changing parameters, , and changing variables, , so that:   
  
 
 
(1) 
 
where and  denote the full sample and the second period (2010-2012) estimates, 
 and  stand for fundamental variable values in March 2012 and January 2010, 
respectively. 
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In particular we decompose the difference between the model-implied value for March 
2012 due to the 2010-2012 period estimates and the model-implied value for January 2010 
due to the full sample estimates. 
H5: Not only the fundamental changes, but also changes in investor preferences led to 
the relative worsening of Hungarian CDS spreads. 
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3. Results 
     3.1. H1: We can only give partial answer to the question in H1; the answer 
depends on the utility function of the issuer. 
 
In Part II, theoretical models arrive at different rankings for expected revenue; however, 
they do reveal the relationship between the bids submitted and the auction technique. These 
results are confirmed both by ‘laboratory’ experiments and the empirical evidence of real-
world auctions. The latter may also provide a robust answer to the question of expected 
revenue; the uniform-price format coming out as more beneficial for the Treasury. Still, at 
present the global majority of issuers of government bonds use the discriminatory-price 
format and central bank instruments also tend to be sold in this format. This is because issuers 
may have considerations other than expected revenue. 
The main advantages of the uniform price auction method might be: higher expected 
revenue, low markup between the market price and the auction price (in the long run on 
average), and increased participation in the auctions. 
The discriminatory auctions are able to reduce volatility, reveal the true valuations better, 
and hinder price-manipulations. 
We can only give partial answer on the question in H1. Even though studies of 
auction formats tend to focus on the effect on expected revenue, the issuer may have a 
number of other motives and the considerations to be used to optimize the choice are far 
from clear. Because the utility function of the issuer is not clear, we cannot give an 
accurate answer to which is the better formula in Hungary. However, we might have an 
idea if we pick the aspect on which the issuer should optimize. In the case of the auction 
of Hungarian government bonds, maximizing the expected revenue of the issuer may be 
important. If we accept that maximizing the expected revenue is the aspect on which the 
issuer should optimize, changing the auction format (or conducting an experiment into 
such a change) would be worthwhile if volatility remained persistently low with 
consistently high bid-to-cover ratios. 
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     3.2. H3: We accept H3; banking stability and institutional-political 
background are significant. 
 
In Part III we study the relationship between relative sovereign CDS spreads and a wide 
array of relative country-specific fundamentals on Eastern European data between July 2008 
and March 2012. 
We accept H3, since we find a significant effect not only on standard macroeconomic 
variables (growth expectations, government debt), but also on banking system stability 
and on the institutional-political background in the long-term relationship of relative 
CDS spreads. 
Table 1. Long-run regression results 
Dependent variable Dependent variable
Explanatory variables coefficient std.error sign. Explanatory variables coefficient std.error sign.
PC_GROWTH*(-1) 0.253 0.015 *** PC_GROWTH*(-1) 0.253 0.016 ***
F_BANK 0.310 0.015 *** F_BANK 0.303 0.015 ***
F_EXTERN 0.148 0.015 *** F_EXTERN 0.121 0.017 ***
F_GDEBT 0.211 0.016 *** F_GDEBT 0.203 0.017 ***
PC_INST*(-1) 0.161 0.008 *** PC_INST*(-1) 0.154 0.009 ***
FISCBAL*(-1) -0.024 0.008 *** FISCBAL*(-1) -0.023 0.013 *
RATING_RESIDUAL 0.068 0.012 *** RATING_RESIDUAL 0.068 0.012 ***
Observations 405 Observations 405
Periods 45 Periods 45
Cross-sections 9 Cross-sections 9
R-squared 0.853 R-squared 0.850
adj. R-squared 0.832 adj. R-squared 0.829
D-W stat. 0.165 D-W stat. 0.161
Log CDS spread Log CDS spread
 
Note: For convenience, variables whose increasing values are consistent with CDS spread 
decreases (higher growth, better institutions, better fiscal balance) are multiplied by -1, so 
that their coefficients and t-statistics are aligned with other variables and CDS spreads. All 
equation coefficients are therefore expected to be positive. The right-hand panel uses a 
dummy variable’s interaction with fiscal balance and external position for instruments in 
TSLS estimation. The dummy variable takes a value of 1 in the case of countries with 
relative good “stock-type” variables. Throughout the text we use the common notation for 
significances: * at 10 percent, ** at 5 percent, *** at 1 percent confidence levels. 
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     3.3. H2: We accept H2; changes in fundamentals affect CDS spreads not only 
immediately, but also gradually. 
 
Table 2. Short-run regression results 
Dependent variable Dependent variable Dependent variable
Explanatory variables coefficient std.error sign. Explanatory variables coefficient std.error sign. Explanatory variables coefficient std.error sign.
d(PC_GROWTH*(-1)) 0.084 0.031 *** d(PC_GROWTH*(-1)) 0.068 0.033 ** d(PC_GROWTH*(-1)) 0.080 0.029 ***
d(F_BANK) 0.064 0.089 d(F_BANK) 0.026 0.093 d(F_BANK) 0.032 0.135
d(F_EXTERN) 0.203 0.078 ** d(F_EXTERN) 0.191 0.084 ** d(F_EXTERN) 0.156 0.122
d(F_GDEBT) 0.078 0.072 d(F_GDEBT) 0.045 0.079 d(F_GDEBT) -0.189 0.107 *
d(PC_INST*(-1)) 0.221 0.108 ** d(PC_INST*(-1)) 0.204 0.116 * d(PC_INST*(-1)) 0.125 0.165
d(FISCBAL*(-1)) 0.015 0.013 d(FISCBAL*(-1)) 0.011 0.014 d(FISCBAL*(-1)) 0.021 0.020
d(RATING_RESIDUAL) 0.023 0.036 * d(RATING_RESIDUAL) 0.010 0.037 d(RATING_RESIDUAL) -0.032 0.058
ECM(t-1)*-1 0.110 0.020 *** log(CDS)(t-1)*(-1) 0.106 0.021 *** ECM(t-1)*(-1) 0.099 0.021 ***
PC_GROWTH(t-1)*(-1) 0.034 0.008 *** d(VIX) 0.012 0.002 ***
F_BANK(t-1) 0.027 0.009 *** d(VDAX) 0.003 0.003
F_EXTERN(t-1) 0.011 0.007 d(US_CREDIT) 0.001 0.000 ***
F_GDEBT(t-1) 0.026 0.007 *** d(USD/EUR) 1.324 0.168 ***
V_INST(t-1)*(-1) 0.013 0.005 ***
FISCBAL(t-1)*(-1) -0.008 0.003 **
RATING_RESIDUAL(t-1) 0.002 0.005
Observations 396 Observations 396 Observations 396
Periods 44 Periods 44 Periods 44
Cross-sections 9 Cross-sections 9 Cross-sections 9
R-squared 0.869 R-squared 0.872 R-squared 0.579
adj. R-squared 0.850 adj. R-squared 0.850 adj. R-squared 0.566
D-W stat. 2.003 D-W stat. 1.993 D-W stat. 2.027
Log differences of CDS spreadLog differences of CDS spread Log differences of CDS spread
 
Note: For convenience, again, variables whose increasing values are consistent with CDS 
spread decreases (higher growth, better institutions, better fiscal balance) are multiplied by (-
1), so a positive coefficient is expected everywhere in the table. The ECM, and lagged CDS 
spreads are also inverted this way, since originally a negative sign is expected that signals 
adjustment to the long-run equation. CDS spreads are taken as closing values on the 21
st
 of 
each month (or the nearest trading day before), while Consensus Economics’ projections are 
closed before this date in the middle of the month. Other regressors’ values are taken at the 
end of the previous month. 
 
We accept H2, since changes of the fundamental variables mainly affect CDS spreads 
gradually, through an error-correction mechanism. 
Contrary to other studies we do not find higher fiscal deficit being associated with higher 
CDS spreads, which may be a result of reverse causality between credit risk and fiscal 
balance. 
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     3.4. H4: We accept H4; some of the fundamental variables’ impacts are time-
varying. 
 
Figure 1. Explanatory power differences of restricted and unrestricted long-run 
regressions 
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Note: 1-year rolling windows. Dates indicated are ending dates of the estimation window. 
 
We accept H4: our results suggest that some of the fundamental variables’ impacts 
are time-varying and imply relevance of the wake-up call hypothesis. 
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     3.5. H5: We accept H5; the change in investor preferences had a significant 
effect on Hungarian relative CDS spreads. 
 
In Part IV the model discussed in the previous chapter attributes to the Hungarian 
CDS spread’s relative increase in response to both a worsening of fundamentals (growth 
prospects and banking stability) and to a changing in investor preferences: government 
debt, one of the country’s key weaknesses, has become more important in relative 
sovereign risk assessment. 
H5 can therefore be confirmed. 
Figure 2. Fundamental and wake-up call effects in changes of Hungarian spreads 
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Note: Positive values are consistent with relative worsening. 
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     3.6. Practice 
 
While in Hungary, the Government Debt Management Agency (ÁKK) still uses the 
discriminatory format, a verification of the auction method might be particularly topical as, 
following similar steps by other treasuries, the public debt management agency of a country 
in the Central-Eastern-European region, Poland, switched to the uniform-price system in 
January 2012. 
Since a decrease of only 1 basis point in the selling yields could spare the budget in the 
long term a significant amount yearly, this topic is important. As a very simple approximation 
for the effect on the expected revenue, we can state the following: the amount of the 
Hungarian Forint denominated government debt is approximately 13 000 billion HUFs (FX 
denominated debt is not allocated through auctions nowadays in Hungary: FX-bonds are 
allocated subscription-based at road shows, loans are naturally not auctioned). If another 
auction method could reduce the yields of the newly issued government debt, every basis 
point gained in the yearly yields could save around 0.01 percent for the state in the long term 
(when every previously issued paper ran out), that is ceteris paribus 1.3 billion HUFs yearly. 
Most authors have found a difference around 1-3 basis points between the revenue of the 
different auction methods
1
. The analysis may also be useful in reconsidering the form of 
auction for the central bank instruments introduced during the crisis and for the design of the 
format for the sale of any new instruments to be launched in the future. 
Sovereign CDS spreads have received increasing attention in the past several years. The 
financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the ensuing sovereign crisis of the Eurozone periphery have 
increased activity in sovereign CDS markets and broadened the market’s scope from 
emerging markets with large bond portfolios in the pre-crisis era to the smaller emerging 
markets and eventually to developed economy sovereigns. Market participants used the 
instrument to either take a speculative position on the credit risk outlook of sovereigns, or to 
hedge credit risk exposure through bonds; whereas analysts, central banks and the financial 
media observed the market to gauge the perceived credit risk of sovereigns. 
                                                 
1 This might be on the one hand a significant amount for the state; on the other hand, this might be 
on the same order of magnitude as some distractions (like the change in liquidity premium which 
might also be affected by the changing market structure) or the estimation uncertainty. 
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In economic policy debates, it is an often argued point whether the change of sovereign 
CDS spreads was based on fundamentals in a volatile environment
2
. Our model is able to 
estimate a relative CDS spread based on fundamentals, so the spread between the model-
based and observed CDS spreads might have important information content in these debates. 
In our model some coefficients seem to be sensitive to the selection of the sample. Time-
variation of parameters is supported by simple rolling regressions, pointing to an increase of 
government debt, banking stability and external balance in the assessment of relative riskiness 
of countries, which might be important in setting economic policy goals. 
                                                 
2 Policy makers (also Monetary Council members) often argue that observed CDS spreads will tend to 
fundamental-based eqilibria in the long term. 
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     3.7. Own publications 
 
Part II was discussed at the November 15, 2012 meeting of the Monetary Forum, it has 
been presented at several conferences and it is published in Hungarian in the Közgazdasági 
Szemle (Monostori [2013c]) and in English in MNB Occasional Papers (Monostori [2014]). 
The author also has other publications concerning government debt financing costs. 
Monostori [2012b] at Hitelintézeti Szemle is a paper about risk premia of government bond 
yields. Another paper at Society and Economy (Monostori [2013e]) is about sovereign bond 
market liquidity developments on the Hungarian market. While the article in MNB Bulletin 
(Erhart et al. [2013]) is not exactly about government debt financing costs, that topic (central 
banks’ balance sheet strategies) is nowadays also related to the main topic of the dissertation. 
Part III and Part IV were published only at conferences up to this moment (Kocsis – 
Monostori, [2013a]; Kocsis – Monostori, [2013b]); however, another output of the same 
research will be submitted in the upcoming weeks to Economics of Transition. These parts are 
results of a common research with Zalán Kocsis (and Zsolt Kuti also had some significant 
contributions). 
Also some further conference publications are worth mentioning. (Monostori [2013a]; 
[2013b]; [2013d]; [2012a]; [2012c]; [2012d]; [2011a]; [2011b]; [2010]). 
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     3.8. Structure 
 
The structure of the dissertation is as follows. 
Part I gives an introduction. 
The main question of Part II is: which one of the most commonly used (discriminatory- 
and uniform price) auction formats has the more beneficial effect on government debt 
financing costs.  This part starts with an introduction, which is followed by theoretical 
models. Next, empirical (both laboratory and non-laboratory) evidences are presented which 
is followed by the description of the international practice. The part is finished by summary 
and conclusions. 
In Part III, the main question is: which fundamentals are the most important country-
specific determinants of sovereign CDS spreads in Eastern Europe. After the introduction and 
literature review, data and methodology are described. Next, we present the general results, 
the variation of the most important factors in time and robustness checks. Finally, we 
conclude. 
Part IV investigates the Hungarian sovereign CDS spread’s developments through our 
model in the last few years. After introducing and presenting the stylized facts, model 
explanations for the deterioration are shown. Then we give explanations for the residuals of 
the model, and finally we conclude this part. 
Part V gives a summary about the most important results of the dissertation. 
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